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The formation of political parties was a particularly late 
development in Sarawak, and the process did not actually com­
mence until 1959. Following upon a century of rule by the 
Brooke Rajahs (1841-1941) and the brief Japanese occupation 
(1941-1945), local political activity prior to 1959 was channeled 
through various community organizations, and furthermore was con­
fined almost exclusively to Islamic and Chinese groups. For 
Muslims, the central question at issue was the Cession of 
Sarawak from the Brooke Rajahs to the British Crown in 1946. A 
vigorous series of mass protests took place from 1946 to 1949, 
after which the British Government firmly closed all legitimate 
means of reversing this alteration in constitutional status.
For the Chinese, the struggle on the mainland of China was the 
object of considerable attention and helped stimulate analogous 
conflicts within the leadership of Sarawak Chinese. The result 
of that conflict was a decided shift in the distribution of 
power within the Chinese community away from the conservative 
and wealthy toward those of a more left-wing disposition. By 
contrast with Malaya, the Left in Sarawak was not emasculated by 
an abortive insurrection. For almost all who can be called 
Dayak,* 1 political activity was a completely new sphere and even 
in the early 1960Ts, their political expression can be characterized 
as essentially a reaction to that initiated by the other commun­
ities .
The stimuli for forming political parties varied a good deal. 
The first party (SUPP) was an outgrowth of those pressure groups 
which had resisted Government policy in the spheres of education 
and trade licensing; it also expressed an inchoate desire for a 
measure of self-determination. The process that set the party 
in motion included a good deal of official British encouragement.
The second party (PANAS) was concerned less with grievances than
EditorsT Note: The spelling of terms in this article will fol­
low current Malay usage rather than the Indonesian trans­
literations usually employed in this journal. A map of 
Sarawak is located on p. 223.
1. Following Dutch usage, we have for convenience employed the 
term "Dayak" to describe all indigenous peoples who have not 
adopted the Islamic religion. The principal Dayak groups are: 
Iban (Sea Dayak), Land Dayak, Kenyah, Kayan and Kelabit. The 
only exception to this usage are the Melanau, none of whom are 
included as Dayak. They are coastal peoples who are steadily 
adopting Islam, and by 1960, only a quarter of all Melanaus 
had not "entered" Islam.
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with protecting the interests of other communities, in light of 
the successes achieved by SUPP. Official encouragement was even 
more important for PANAS. The last four parties were all formed 
after it had become clear that the state was shortly to gain in­
dependence within the Federation of Malaysia.
Articulation of grievances became progressively less impor­
tant ak first inter-communal and then intra-communal rivalries 
became the dominant motivation for those who were building polit­
ical parties. In order to highlight this shift of emphasis in 
the character of each new party— particularly the change from 
inter- to intra-communal conflict— we shall examine in turn the 
political activity of each of the three major racial groups: Chinese, Malay and Dayak.
Sarawak United PeopleTs Party: SUPP
The Brookes used, but did not really bother to understand, 
the Chinese community. They respected the industry of that 
race but harbored a suspicion of Chinese activities and inten­
tions, a suspicion firmly based upon mutual ignorance and com­
mon disdain. Ever since the 1857 revolt--in which Bau Chinese 
kongsi members sacked Kuching— the Brookes had rigidly enforced 
the law that membership in a secret society was a capital offense. 
Thus that organizational form of the overseas Chinese was stead­
ily emasculated. The functional void was in due course filled 
by a variety of Chinese commercial, dialect and religious organi­zations .
The Sarawak Government officially sponsored Chinese immi­
gration, and until 1931, a Chinese could legally be regarded as 
a native, a term then of nationality rather than ethnic status. 
Since that year "native” has been defined to mean, in effect, 
non-Chinese. The classification denoted a privileged status, 
not carrying any of the pejorative connotations only too evident 
elsewhere.
A coincidence of interest existed between China and Britain 
throughout World War II, and the Chinese in Sarawak, with but a 
few individual exceptions, proved to be generally anti-Japanese. 
They had much to gain from the new, more equal, post-war colonial 
order which resulted from the Cession to Britain in 1946; their 
educated manpower was immediately placed at a high premium be­
cause 335 Malay civil servants had resigned in protest. Due to 
their private school system, the Chinese were the only community 
able to provide the requisite skilled personnel.2
2. Elementary literacy by race in 1947 was: Chinese 34%; Malay 
15%; Melanau 9%; Land Dayak 7%; Iban and "other indigenous" 
2%. Sarawak, Colonial Development and Welfare Plan 1947/8 - 
1955/6, Mimeo. (Kuching, 1950), Appendix B (2).
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Chinese political interest throughout the turbulent 1940fs 
was focused upon the momentous struggle taking place on the 
Chinese Mainland, not toward what were regarded as the relatively 
insignificant changes in Borneo. The British Colonial Government, 
moreover, was slow to define, much less to reform, its policies 
toward the local Chinese. The only apparent early change in 
policy was the institution of tight immigration control following 
assumption of power by the Communist regime in China.
A central question for the community in Sarawak was to 
determine who would represent the Chinese— what mechanisms 
would be used to select leaders who could deal with the Govern­
ment on behalf of the whole community. Prior to World War II, 
the Chamber of Commerce had been recognized as the official organ 
and mouthpiece of the Chinese community, and thus had served as 
the primary political link between the Government and the Chinese. 
Kapitans China and Area Headmen had been officially appointed for 
each dialect group, the chief criteria for their selection being 
wealth— sheer economic power. The Chamber of Commerce thus 
formed the apex of the Chinese community, granting representation 
and leadership roles in accordance with relative wealth.
Just four months after the Japanese capitulated, a general 
assembly attended by representatives of twenty-two Sarawak 
Chinese associations was called in order to form, in Kuching, 
one central Chinese organization with which the Miliary Adminis­
tration could deal directly, thus avoiding the pitfalls inherent 
in dealing with a multitude of dialect associations. The result­
ing Chung Hua Association directed immediate concern toward clari­
fication of a Chinese position on the question of Cession, and 
the formation of a "Chinese Democratic Political Society." No 
less pressing was the problem of resuscitating the Chinese school 
system. The Chung Hua Association had a short life. Its politi­
cal functions were assumed by the Chinese Advisory Board, estab­
lished in 1947 by the new Colonial Government, and by the new 
Chinese Consul installed in Kuching in 1948.3 4 Both the Chung Hua 
Association and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce issued statements 
welcoming the new Consul, adding that he would now become the 
representative of Sarawak Chinese to the Chinese Government and 
to the local Sarawak Government. * The Colonial Government took
3. Dr. Chan Ying-ming, former Consul in San Francisco, officially 
arrived in Kuching in January 1948. The local business com­
munity immediately began raising funds to build a permanent 
consulate in Kuching. See, Sarawak Tribune, April 28 and 
August 9, 1947; January 20, 1948.
4. Ibid., March 9, 1948. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce decided
to divest itself of any representative functions, issuing a 
statement that: nThe Consulate now becomes the authorized
and recognized official body representing the Chinese com­
munity as a whole.” Ibid., January 7, 1949.
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immediate exception to such a suggestion, for Sarawak-born 
Chinese were regarded as British subjects, and not the respon­
sibility of a foreign Consul.
By this time, the Administration was seeking to expand the 
role of its urban Chinese Advisory Boards and planning Chinese 
participation in its new structure of local government. At any 
rate, the change of regime in China terminated official Chinese 
representation in Sarawak. The change to a less acceptable 
mainland Chinese leadership brought a new Government emphasis 
upon the necessity for local Chinese to choose whether their 
future allegiance would be directed toward China or toward 
Sarawak. The Sarawak Government emphasized that British recog­
nition of Communist China, "does not mean that the determination 
of the British Government to oppose the extension of communism 
into British Territories is in any way weakening. . . . "5 Fly­
ing of any foreign flag was restricted, a measure that sought 
both to avoid demonstration of divisions within the Chinese com­
munity, as well as to prevent the old Sarawak flag being flown as 
a symbol of the struggle against Cession. The Government did 
permit the community to celebrate the new Chinese National Day 
with mass meetings, and the Government Secretary for Chinese 
Affairs even addressed at least one of these rallies. The 
"double tenth" anniversary of the Nationalist Chinese was also 
celebrated, but it was sponsored by a dwindling number of com­
munity associations, and by October 1952, received public suport 
from only two local bodies.6
Education has always been a matter of pivotal concern for 
the whole of the Chinese community. Chinese settlers, wherever 
they have located themselves in Sarawak, have invariably estab­
lished their own schools, which in due course became the focal 
meeting points for each local community. Prior to World War II, 
community leadership was held by the wealthy, who were usually 
Government-supported (holding the position of Kapitan or Area 
Headman) and who had the "correct" Kuomintang connections. These 
men usually underwrote the schools, and, as a result, their views 
regarding selection of teachers and management of schools held 
sway.
In Kuching,before the war, the Chinese community ran the 
schools on a clan basis. Thus the Hokkien School was meant to
5. Ibid., January 7, 1950.
6. The Secretary spoke at length on "liberty" under the new
Chinese regime, contrasting the restrictions there with the 
freedoms prevailing in Sarawak. Ibid., October 2, 1951. For 
a list of the associations sponsoring the yearly "double 
tenth" celebrations, see: Ibid., September 12, 1950;
September 27, 1951; September 23, 1952.
193
serve the Hokkien community only, the Min Teck School to serve 
children of the Teochew community, and so on. Shortly after 
the war, a single board was formed to manage all Chinese secondary 
schools in Kuching, and the various associations loaned their 
school properties to that board.
No Chinese schools were included among the responsibilities 
of the Education Department until 1946. Any liaison on matters 
pertaining to these schools was directed through the Government 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs. Addressing the Council Negri in 
1924, Rajah Vyner Brooke had said, "He was sorry to find in cer­
tain Chinese schools the opportunity had been taken by unscru­
pulous teachers to preach revolution propaganda [sic]."7 None­
theless, his Government actually did little more than issue 
regulations. For instance, the 1924 General Regulations forbad 
smoking opium or cooking food in the classroom.
A dramatic change occurred after the war,when young militants 
began to challenge effectively the conservative's control of the 
Chinese schools. As a result of a series of incidents in the 
early 1950Ts, most Boards of Management were "taken over" by 
the Left, and the Chinese school system as a whole became the 
focus of a new Chinese leadership, opposed to the older and 
wealthier Government-recognized leaders. Chinese schools thus 
became the scene of sporadic conflict as the Government extended 
its control over activities formerly within the confines of the 
Chinese education system and sought to bolster the authority of 
all who could hinder the leftward trend.
For a time the scene was quite lively. In 1951, two hundred 
Kuching students went on strike. The Government reacted by 
preferring criminal charges against the leaders and proscribing 
two youth organizations as subversive. The Government itself 
precipitated confrontation in early 1954 by dropping the 17th 
Mile (Kuching-Serian Rd.) Chinese school from its register because 
of alleged pro-Communist activity by its teaching staff and 
Board of Management. The following year, a two-month student 
strike occurred in Kuching, ending only after direct government 
intervention. In the course of the strike, Stephen Yong and 
Ong Kee Hui, two leaders who subsequently gained political 
prominence, played a key role in a special committee established 
to resolve the strike. Other incidents occurred in Kuching,
Sibu and Miri which the Government believed were exacerbated 
by the refusal, or at least inability, of school management com­
mittees to take a firm stand against dissenters. Meanwhile the 
Left was making considerable inroads, in a manner that the Govern­
ment could not readily confront. Disparaging comments and rumors 
which called into question the morality of certain teachers were 
circulated and proved difficult to rebut directly. As a result, 
many teachers requested transfer to other districts, or simply
7. Ibid., May 17, 1957.
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did not have their local contracts renewed. The precarious 
economic position of Chinese school teachers made them especial­
ly vulnerable to any concerted pressure from those opposed to 
their political views.8
After completing an official study on financing education 
and conditions of service in the teaching profession, the Govern­
ment published a White Paper and new Grant Code regulations to 
take effect from 1956. These recommendations, though hardly 
radical, represented the first real attempt by the Government 
substantially to assist and re-direct the system of Chinese 
education. In his report, Woodhead had noted the reliance of 
Chinese schools upon donations (some in the form of a levy upon 
merchants) and had suggested a nbargain,n with the Government 
offering substantial financial assistance in return for a mea­
sure of Government control over the content of the curriculum.9
The instinctive Chinese reaction was to reject the proposals 
out of hand, and a Preserve Chinese Education Committee swung 
into action; telegrams of support came from all over Sarawak.
A Sarawak Chinese Education Council was formed, in line with a 
suggestion from Sarikei, where local Chinese representatives had 
not rejected outright the Government proposals. After long and 
rather more sober discussion this Council resolved, by thirteen 
votes to twelve, to accept the Grants under the new regulations.1 
The Government had indeed struck a bargain, though this bargain 
was of a transient character. By the start of the new decade, a 
major new controversy had surfaced as the Government sought to 
determine the future of Chinese education.
In December 1954, Council Negri approved a revised scale of 
trade licensing fees, designed to yield a further M$ 3.5 million 
per annum in revenue to the Government in order to maintain 
social services and meet the increased demands for educational 
expansion outlined in the Woodhead Report.11 The new rates, in
8. Report of the District Officer, Lubok Antu, for the second 
half of 1956.
9. "The recommendations are based on two assumptions; first, 
that aid of a sufficient size is necessary to make a reason­
able bargain; second, that Chinese understand a bargain and, 
if the parties enter into it in the right spirit, will keep 
it. It is natural that they should wish to maintain their 
heritage of Chinese language and culture. It is clear also 
that, being intelligent people, they must appreciate the 
necessity for a loyalty to and a knowledge of the country in 
which they live." E. W. Woodhead, The Financing of Education 
and Conditions of Service in the Teaching Profession in 
Sarawak (Kuching; Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 32.
10. Sarawak Tribune, September 30 and November 22, 1955.
11. Ibid., December 30, 1954.
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some cases amounting to increases of 1,000%, were to take effect 
from January 1, 1955. On Christmas day, a protest committee met 
at the Sarikei Chinese Chamber of Commerce and resolved to close 
all shops for the first ten days of the new year. Binatang 
shopkeepers met the next day and decided to follow suit. Sibu 
traders "warmly aired their viewpoints in an electrifying atmos­
phere," and decided to close shop, as did the Kuching traders. 
The hartal spread to Bintulu, Miri and throughout the colony.12
Representatives of all major trading centers converged on 
Kuching to make their feelings known to the Government. As a 
result of this unprecedented pressure, the Government postponed 
application of the new fees, formed a Committee of Enquiry with 
significant local participation, and presented a substantially 
modified Bill to the Council Negri two months later.13 14
These debates concerning education and commerce, conflicts 
political in character, brought to the fore certain leaders of 
ad hoc bodies in Kuching, Sarikei and elsewhere. Shortly there­
after, they coalesced to explore the depth of support for a 
more enduring organization— a political party. Those Chinese 
who had led the opposition to Government policy in the areas of 
education and trade licensing were prominent among the prime 
movers toward formation of the first political party of Sarawak. 
Their experiences were coupled with a heightening of political 
activity in neighboring Singapore, and they were encouraged by 
the then Chief Secretary of Sarawak, Mr. J. H. Ellis, who cir­
culated a memorandum on the need for a political party under 
leaders such as Ong Kee Hui.
The actual launching of a multi-racial party was first 
mooted in 1956 by Ong Kee Hui, Stephen Yong and S. K. Reddi with 
the encouragement of T. G. Dunbar. k But the Malay National
12. On the hartal, see: for Sarikei, Ibid., December 29, 1954;
for Binatang, December 30, 1954; for Sibu, December 31, 1954 
and January 4, 1955.
13. Sarawak, Council Negri, Debates: Official Report (Kuching: 
Government Printing Office, 1955), March 29 and March 30,
1955, pp. 5-6, 11-23.
14. Ong Kee Hui comes from a prominent and wealthy Hokkien 
family and is the grandson of Ong Tiang Swee, the most impor­
tant Chinese leader during the Third Rajah’s rule (1917-1941). 
Educated first in Kuching, then in Singapore, Ong Kee Hui 
next attended the Serdang College of Agriculture in Malaya.
From 1936 to 1946 he worked with the Department of Agricul- 
ture--an experience that gave him a familiarity with the 
Dayak people that is normally missing among urban Chinese.
He was stationed for a long time at Kapit. Beginning as 
English Secretary to the Kuching Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
he helped organize the petition against increased trade license 
fees; he algo acted as an investigator and consultant for the
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Union and the Sarawak Dayak Association activists responded, in 
essence: "We have our organizations already, you form a Chinese
one and then we can talk together."15 Thus the efforts came to 
naught, and the idea was abandoned. The Governor, Sir Anthony 
Abell, did privately encourage Ong Kee Hui to form a broadly 
representative party, but the principal difficulty was the ab­
sence of significant native interest in and support for the idea.
Spurred by a local newspaper article written by an influen­
tial young Malay, Safri Awang, which introduced the possibility 
of real native participation, Ong Kee Hui, Stephen Yong and Song 
Thian Cheok earnestly set about founding a party that was to be, 
"Non-communal in character, with emphasis on loyalty to Sarawak 
and unity of all races."16 * They were aided in their efforts by 
discreet Government encouragement and a letter from the Tuan Muda,
community committees investigating school disturbances and the 
Woodhead Report. A member of the Kuching Municipal Council 
since 1953 (President from 1960 to 1965), he represented that 
Council in the Council Negri from 1956 to 1963 and served con­
currently as a member of the Cabinet, the Supreme Council. He 
had a close rapport with Sir Anthony Abell, Governor of Sarawak 
in the 1950Ts, but as he persisted in his intent to lead SUPP 
in opposition to British policy, colonial officials began to 
lose faith in him as their chosen leader for the state.
Stephen Yong, by contrast, came from quite humble origins, 
his father being a Hakka small trader in the outlying town of 
Simunjan, After his father’s death, Yong left school and 
worked for a time as a messenger before receiving a scholar­
ship to further his education. Immediately after the war he 
was a merchant and then went to England, becoming a Barrister- 
at-Law. Upon his return, he worked closely with Ong Kee Hui 
on the various aspects of Chinese education. His background 
is much more Chinese and rather more proletarian than that of 
Ong Kee Hui, though he is linked by marriage to a Kuching 
Hokkien of the Ong clan.
Both Reddi and Dunbar had practiced law in Singapore. In 
1956, Dunbar and Stephen Yong had a common legal practice.
S. K. Reddi, finding himself in an awkward position after 
representing workers at the British base in Singapore, estab­
lished his permanent residence in Sarawak. T. G. Dunbar was 
more closely associated with Singapore, and in due course he 
returned there.
15. Interview, Ong Kee Hui, 1967. The Kuching Municipal elections 
of 1956 were then the focus that stimulated political organi­
zation. Behind the scene activities directed toward the organ­
ization of a party, or parties, were strongly rumored at the 
time. Sarawak Tribune, editorial, May 2M-, 195 6.
16. Interview, Ong Kee Hui, November 1967; Sarawak Tribune, March 
5, 1959. The Safri Awang article appeared in ibid., March
4, 1959.
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Mr. Anthony Brooke, to the Malay National Union encouraging the 
latter to support the formation of a party.
Native reaction was generally non-committal. Mohd. bin 
Haji Bakri, president of the Malay National Union, said, MHe 
fully and sincerely supported the suggestion and emphasized that 
if necessary his Union would join the party as one unit.” The 
General Secretary of the Malay National Union, Ikhwan Haji Zainie, 
thought, however, "It would be much better for each community to 
form a National Union, such as the Chinese, Malay, Dayak and 
Indian National Unions, and eventually merge to form an Alliance 
like that in the Federation of Malaya." In the opinion of the 
Sarawak Dayak National Union President, Edward Brandah, "It was 
still too premature for the whole of Sarawak to form any politi­
cal parties. At this stage, we should concentrate on the educa­
tion for our younger generation and the raising of the standard 
of living for all communities."17 Safri himself withheld personal 
commitment to the party, and shortly thereafter he was sent over­
seas for further education. No other important Malays were will­
ing to participate in the party, but after talking with the 
Governor and gaining his approval, various Dayak leaders, includ­
ing Temenggong Jugah and Pengarah Montegrai, did agree to support 
it. 1 8
Just a few weeks before the party was formally inaugurated, 
however, the Governor cautioned:
It is . . . essential that party politics should not
cause further divisions in our community but should 
have a unifying and binding effect. If a party tends 
to be dominated by one race or class . . .  it may 
have a disintegrating effect on our community. . . .
I frankly doubt if political parties at the present 
stage of development will spell faster progress in 
this small country. . . .18 9
Government ambivalence on the issue worried Dayaks who hitherto 
were accustomed to clear directives. The Governor’s declaration 
had the immediate effect of persuading various important Dayaks 
not to join. To be successful, the party desperately needed a 
solid native component. The process of party formation had gained
17. Sarawak Tribune, March 5, 1959.
18. Subsequently each side interpreted "support" differently. The 
Temenggong and Pengarah claimed that they had simply agreed 
not to oppose formation of the party; the SUPP leadership felt 
that a commitment to lead the party had been made and were bit­
terly disappointed by the failure of these two important Dayaks 
to join SUPP.
19. Sarawak Information Service, Sarawak By the Week, Week No. 21, 
1959, p . 3.
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too much momentum to be halted readily, and on June 12, 1959, the 
Sarawak United Peoplefs Party (SUPP) was formally inaugurated, 
ushering in the new era of party politics.
Why had the Government appeared to lose its enthusiasm for 
this party, even prior to its actual formation? The Government 
had beten aware of communist activities within the Chinese com­
munity but it had not anticipated the enthusiasm with which 
these "angry young Chinese" would cluster behind SUPP. In early 
1959, the underground communist organization distributed a trea­
tise entitled "On the Formation of an Open Political Party and 
the Struggle for Independence." It was intercepted by the Govern­
ment. Among other things, the pamphlet stated:
The revolution is now at a low-ebb, a passive atmos­
phere exists not only in the masses but even in our 
organization. What can be done about it? According 
to the analysis above, the only way open to us is to 
form an open political party. If we persist in secret 
work and fail boldly to organize a political party, we 
shall erawl along as before. We must readjust our 
ranks, propagate amongst the masses and create favor­
able conditions for the formation of a political 
party.2 0
The militant left-wing Chinese did wholeheartedly support SUPP, 
somewhat too eagerly in fact, and their enthusiasm aroused native 
suspicion. As time passed, the Government became progressively 
more worried by the militant character of SUPP branch leadership.
There is no simple way to express recruitment to each of 
the political parties as they developed— particularly in the 
absence of access to membership lists. Even if reliable lists 
were available, a good deal of biographical data would still be 
necessary in order to interpret the lists. Indeed the very 
definition of a party member is open to question, considering 
that each political party received less votes in the 1963 elec­
tions than the total number of members it claimed.20 1
20. Sarawak Information Service, The Danger Within: A History of 
the Clandestine Communist Organisation in Sarawak (Kuching: 
Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 25-29.
21. SUPP was the closest to its claim; PANAS claimed 72,249 mem­
bers and received 28,242 votes, and SNAP scored about the same 
proportion. The total number of members claimed by SUPP was 
44,767 in June 1962, 50,219 in January 1963, 51,901 in November 
1965 and 49,042 in June 1967. This reduction was attributed
to the legal requirement that, as from January 1966, only 
Malaysian citizens could be members of political parties, thus 
excluding various Chinese born outside Malaysia until they had 
been naturalized. SUPP secured 45,493 votes in the 1963 
District Council elections.
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The characteristics of those recruited by each party can be 
indicated by describing party members, divided according to their 
race and locality, as contained in official party releases. But 
these sources are easily manipulated and must be treated with 
great reservations as they probably represent the most optimistic 
estimate within the realm of credibility. One could also deter­
mine the characteristics of party members by examining the com­
position of the branch executives of each party, that is the 
leaders elected to head each party at the local level.22 23 This 
approach is much less susceptible to distortion. From this 
information, one can ascertain both the areas where the party 
estimated that it had enough support to form a branch, and, 
given the salient characteristics of branch executive members, 
the predominant community among which the party has gained sup­
port in any particular district. One can also ascertain the 
extent of penetration by the party of other organizations by 
identifying overlapping membership of party committees and the 
executive bodies of other local organizations.
SUPP branches and sub-branches spread slowly throughout 
Sarawak. Initial efforts were concentrated in the First and 
Third Divisions, but during the latter half of 1960, branches 
were established in all other Divisions. By the end of 1961, 
half the branches were located in the First Division, almost a 
third in the Third Division, and the remainder elsewhere. By 
mid-1962, SUPP appeared to have spread its influence fairly 
pervasively throughout the state, for its overall geographic 
distribution of members accorded well with a breakdown of total 
population by Division.
SUPP Membership by Division— June 196223
Division of Sarawak First Second Third Fourth Fifth Total
SUPP Members 34.5% 13.5% 41 % 9 % 2 % 100%
Total Population 35 % 14 % 34 % 13 % 4 % 100%
But its racial balance was skewed in favor of Chinese and against 
Malays, Melanaus and the "other indigenous" peoples.
22. A third approach would be to identify and analyze the type 
of candidate nominated and/or elected by each party. This 
method is being used elsewhere by the author.
23. Report of the Secretary-General, S.K.T. Yong, given at the 
SUPP Third Delegates’ Conference, Sarawak by the Week,
Week No. 23, 1962.
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SUPP Membership by Ethnic Group— January 19632 *
Land Malay, Melanau 6
Ethnic group Chinese Iban Dayak other indigenous Total
SUPP Members 54 % 32 % 6.5% 7.5% 100%
Total Population 31.5% 31 % 8 % 29.5% 100%
The composition of SUPP branch executives, though tending 
to over-represent natives as against Chinese, gives the most 
accurate available indication of the party’s success at recruit­
ing new members. During the period 1959 to 1962, six of the 
thirteen SUPP branches for which information is available did 
have a majority of non-Chinese executive members, and by the 1965 
to 1968 period, six of the nineteen branches. For actual control, 
however, the position of the branch Secretary is crucial; SUPP 
practice has been to appoint natives to the prestigeous position 
of Chairman, while using Chinese as Secretaries. From 1959 to 
1962, five of the six native-majority branches had Chinese 
Secretaries, and counting the nineteen branches legally regis­
tered as of October 1967, fifteen had Chinese Secretaries and 
fifteen had native Chairmen--fourteen Dayaks and one Malay.24 5 By 
employing the requirement of both a clear native majority and a 
non-Chinese branch Secretary, one finds that only the Kapit, 
Simanggang and Lower Sadong branches were under native control. 
Even that control is doubtful in the latter two, for some 40% of 
the executive members were Chinese in both these branches.
Of all the sub-branches existing at the end of 1967, only 
four could have been controlled by other than Chinese— Bekenu, 
Song, Pangkalan Ampat and Bengoh. The Bengoh sub-branch and the 
Kapit branch are the only all-native SUPP organizations. This 
is a new phenomenon and designed to ensure real native control 
over the branches. Recourse to such a racially-exclusive organi­
zational form has been necessitated by the SUPP’s conspicuous 
success at recruiting Chinese and its concomitant failure to 
attract solid native support. It also represents an effort by 
the moderate top leadership of SUPP to develop a measure of real 
support on the branch level, hitherto the province of the 
militant Left.
Control of SUPP is ultimately vested in its Central Committee 
of some 63 members, all of whom are elected by the Delegates1 Con­
ference. Day-to-day management of the party is handled by the
24. Source: SUPP party records.
25. This has been a consistent policy; in May 1962, thirteen of 
the sixteen SUPP branches had native Chairmen. Sarawak Inform­
ation Service, Extracts from the Chinese and Malay Press 
(Kuching), May 26, 1962.
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fifteen-member Central Working Committee. Half of the first 
Central Committee were educated at St. Thomasf Anglican Mission 
School in Kuching,26 and the majority came from Kuching. The 
racial breakdown was: 13 Chinese; 3 Ibans; 2 Malays; 1 Land
Dayak; and 1 Christian Melanau, but one of the two Malays resigned 
within three weeks of his selection.
The character of the Central Committee changed markedly as 
the party developed its mass base. Within a year, it could not, 
by any stretch of the imagination, be caricatured as an "Old 
Thomiansf Association." From 1960 onward, half of the Central 
Committee members have been natives, though natives have formed 
only one-third to one-quarter of the Central Working Committee 
each year.27 The racial composition of the Central Committee 
in the period 1960 to 1962 was: 20 Chinese; 10 Ibans; 5 Malays,
3 Melanaus; and 2 Land Dayaks. A lower proportion (less than 
half) were from Kuching.
The characteristics of Central Committee members did not 
change drastically in the ensuing years, with the exception of 
1962, when ten Chinese members departed for China, the Centre 
for Protective Custody, or the jungle— most in the wake of the 
abortive Brunei revolt. Five natives also resigned at that time 
from the Central Committee. The Central Committee elected in 
June 1966 included: 17 Ibans; 9 Malays; 2 Land Dayaks; 1 Kenyah;
and 28 Chinese.28 29 The twenty-eight Chinese, were: 13 Hakka/Kheh;
9 Hokkien; 3 Foochow; 2 Hailam; and 1 Cantonese. When compared 
with the breakdown of the Chinese population given in the 1960 
Census, one notes a significant over-representation of Hakka 
and Hokkien within SUPP. and an under-representation of Foochow, 
Teochew and Cantonese.2 ^
26. Of the twenty members, I have positive information that nine 
were students and one a teacher at St. Thomas’; others may 
also have been educated! there.
27. The proportion of natives on the Central Committee has been
as follows: 1960, 50%; 1962, 49%; 1966, 47%. The propor­
tion of natives on the Central Working Committee has been: 
1962-64, 33%; 1964-66, 13%; 1968-70, 23%.
28. Another five Chinese under detention were symbolically 
elected, but, for official purposes, the party did not 
consider them on the Committee, and they will not be counted 
in this analysis.
29. The 1960 figures for the total population list the Chinese
community as composed of (in rounded figures): Foochow,
70,000; Hakka, 70,000; Hokkien, 28,000; Teochew, 22,000; 
Cantonese, 17,000; Henghua, 8,000; and Hailam, 6,000.
Sarawak, Report on the Census of Population Taken on June 
15th 1960 by L. W. Jones (Kuching: Government Printing 
Office, 1962), p. 128 .
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The party claims to receive most of its financial support 
from membership fees and donations. SUPP nominees are expected 
to donate to the party their salaries as members of the Council 
Negri or the Federal Parliament. This major source of support 
totalled M$H1,000 in the financial year 1966-67. Large creditors 
to the party in that year included the Kwong Lee Bank, the 
Sarawiak Transport Company and Mr. Ho Ho Lim, the party Treasurer. 
The Bjian Chiang Bank was reputed to have advanced substantial 
sums to the party to assist in meeting campaign expenses for the 
1963 elections; at that time Ong Kee Hui was Manager of the Bank.30
An important source of funds for SUPP were the receipts from 
its periodic "fun fairs," usually held in connection with anni­
versary celebrations for each of the branches and for the party 
as a whole. These were an important means of profitably direct­
ing the energies and enthusiasm of young supporters. The Govern­
ment has steadily restricted these fairs by withholding or with­
drawing police permission for such gatherings. Other important 
sources of organized support were the Chinese trade unions; their 
political activities have been heavily circumscribed because the 
Government has sought to encourage the development of a multi­
plicity of smaller "peanut" unions.
The Sarawak Transport Company has played a very important 
role both as a source of funds and as a conduit for channeling 
SUPP influence throughout the First and Second Divisions. The 
companyTs buses ply almost every passable through road in those 
Divisions, and extend as far as Sarikei in the Third Division.
A labor-intensive business, the company employs a large number 
of drivers, conductors and ticket sellers, many of whom are party 
members. The company is also able to transDort party workers 
throughout its network and carry propaganda materials and news­
papers. The Managing-Director of the company, Chan Siaw Hee,31
30. In 1967, however, this same bank, under the management of Ong 
Kee HuiTs brother-in-law, Dato Wee Hood Teck, made political 
donations totalling M$5 5,L)-7 8 to the rival party SNAP. Bian 
Chiang Bank Berhad, Directors f Report for the Financial Year 
Ending December 31 , 196 7 (Kuching, July 29, 1968), p. 4"!
Wee Kheng Chiang, the founder of the bank, married the 
daughter of Ong Tieng Swee, thus consolidating his position 
as a rising power in the Hokkien business community. Wee; ap­
pointed his nephew, Ong Kee Hui, as manager of the bank,which 
then advanced loans to SUPP, and reputedly to PANAS, to help 
fund their 1963 election campaigns. These "investments" did 
not pay particularly good dividends, and Ong was replaced as 
managing-director by Wee Hood Teck, son of Wee Kheng Chiang. 
Wee chose to underwrite SNAP, particularly after it had moved 
into the opposition.
31. Chan, a Chao Ann of respectable means, has long been an enig­
matic figure within the party. He could deal authoritatively 
with the Government on behalf of the militant left wing of 
the party and regularly issued strident denunciations of
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is Publicity Officer of SUPP and a prominent militant member of 
the partyfs Central Working Committee. Because its continued 
prosperity is dependent upon official licenses, the company is 
vulnerable to Government pressure, especially at a time when, 
in other Divisions, natives are accorded clear preference in the 
field of transportation. Thus twin arguments— both political 
and native advancement— could readily be employed to re-allocate 
licenses from the Sarawak Transport Company, removing an important 
financial and organizational proffered from SUPP.
Based upon a check of overlapping membership, SUPP members 
and sympathizers over the past decade have controlled the Kuching 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the leading commercial body in 
Sarawak since 1930. This was true for each year except 1964 and 
1965, the same two years in which there was a dramatic increase 
in the proportion of the party executive who were Teochew and 
Cantonese and a decrease in the number of Hokkien and Hakka.
Almost to a man, the new Teochew and Cantonese Committee members 
were supporters of the conservative Sarawak Chinese Association. 
These same men were voted off the Committee when the Hokkien and 
Hakka, who favored SUPP, regained control.
Communist penetration of SUPP is the subject of many Govern­
ment statements and documents. The other side of the issue, 
apart from strident denials, has not been adequately aired, and 
it is difficult to evaluate how much weight and reliability to 
place upon official statements released to serve as political 
polemics. The moderate leaders of SUPP faced a dilemma about 
how to treat those party members detained by the Government but 
not tried and convicted by a court. Party leaders could not 
justify expulsion without any substantive evidence being pro- 
fered by the Government, evidence which would satisfy a court 
of law.32 * On the other hand, the Government became annoyed, then
Government policy, yet he remained free of political detention, 
unlike many who were more cautious. When he was finally 
detained in August 1968 (for fourteen months), the Govern­
ment tried to win him over by kindness; upon release he 
issued a quite conditional confession, phrased to allow him 
to continue an active role within the party.
32. Interviews with Ong Kee Hui, January 21, 1963, and September 
3, 1964. The Central Working Committee did decide to expel 
all members convicted by the Court of Subversive Activities-- 
a substantial concession since the law interpreted "sub­
version" quite broadly. The party also "relieved of their 
duties" members held under the Restricted Residence Ordinance.
The left-wing members clearly feared that the Government, 
working together with the moderate SUPP leaders, would follow the 
example of Singapore, where a judicious wave of detentions 
tipped the balance of control within the People!s Action 
Party, enabling Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues to maintain 
control at a critical period. Some SUPP members feared
204
somewhat suspicious, at the failure of the leaders to act against 
men it considered to be dedicated communists.
At the top level of the party, there was only one openly 
publicized crisis between the moderate and militant members of 
the Central Committee. That dispute occurred in 1965 and con­
cerned participation of SUPP in the Malaysia Solidarity Conven­
tion, front of pro-Malaysia opposition parties headed by Lee 
Kuan Yew. On this issue, the Central Committee divided, with 
twenty-four "moderates" favoring and twenty-nine "militants” 
against SUPP participation; at this juncture, the Chairman and 
Secretary-General, Ong Kee Hui and Stephen Yong, resigned tem­
porarily. 3 3
Sarawak Chinese Association: SCA
With the imminent approach of independence in 1963, various 
wealthy Chinese had perceived their need for a political organi­
zation other than SUPP. Though SUPP had gained very substantial 
support from Sarawak Chinese, it was committed to remain socialist 
in outlook and might well be left completely outside the Govern­
ment. By mid-1962, moves were afoot, with Malayan encouragement, 
to form an alliance of Sarawak right-wing parties— similar to 
that which had successfully governed the Malayan Federation for 
the past five years. With the urging of the Malayan Chinese 
Association, the uni-racial Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA) 
was inaugurated in July 1962. The party pledged to work toward 
communal unity as a preliminary to broader national unity, based 
upon an alliance of racial parties, and also considered the pos­
sibility of affiliation with the Malayan Chinese Association.31*
The chronological connection between the visits of Malayan Chinese 
Association delegates, the founding of the Sarawak Chinese Associ­
ation and the formation of a Sarawak Alliance was rather too 
close to be coincidental.
The founders of the SCA were drawn from two business groups 
conspicuously absent from SUPP Central Committees— the Kuching
that their leadership had access to security records and 
especially suspected the Chairman; he never did have such a 
right apparently.
33. Sarawak Tribune, June 28, 1965. 34
34. Ibid., August 3, 1962. The original constitution included
the sentence: "The Association may be affiliated to the MCA
whose headquarters are in Kuala Lumpur." This line was typed, 
but then struck out from the final draft. The SCA constitu­
tion was almost an exact copy of the MCA constitution, with 
only minor amendments. See also: ibid., June 27, 1962.
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Teochews and the Sibu Foochows. William Tan, the first President 
of the party and a former civil servant, was a "Queen’s Chinese" 
in every way.35 In addition to wealthy businessmen, the founders 
included some younger English-educated Chinese and others who 
were simply dissatisfied with SUPP. SCA also attracted the 
older, more conservative Chinese-educated who considered SUPP 
a youngsters’ party and resented its activities, but SCA was 
marked by its nearly complete failure to engender any real 
enthusiasm among the young. This is explained by its image as 
just another Chinese Association, a group of wealthy businessmen 
of the past era seeking to perpetuate their influence by partic­
ipation in the new Malaysian ruling elite.36 SCA has claimed 
between 2,000 and 3,000 members throughout Sarawak, a figure con­
sidered fairly accurate in contrast to the inflated claims of 
most other parties.
The Kuching group formed a majority of members of the first 
Central Committee of SCA. But with the approach of general 
elections, feelings of dissatisfaction arose within the party 
regarding alleged inadequate preparation and funding for the SCA 
campaign, and as a result, the composition of the Central Com­
mittee was changed. In the process, William Tan was relegated 
to the newly-created position of Patron, and a wealthy Sibu 
timber merchant, Ling Beng Siew became President.37
The representatives from the First Division (principally 
Teochew) held a majority on the first Central Committee, but 
with the passage of time, the party came under control of Third 
Division members (principally Foochow). By 1967, well over half 
of the Committee members lived in the Third Division and just
35. William Tan is a Teochew, Roman Catholic and was educated 
at St. Joseph’s School, Kuching. In these three respects, 
he differs from Ong Kee Hui and the other wealthy founders 
of SUPP. Important commercial rivalries were transferred 
into the political arena when he became a founder Vice- 
President of PANAS, then President of SCA. Before that time, 
he had been President of the first fully-elected Kuching Munic­
ipal Council (1956-1959) and a member of the State Cabinet 
(Supreme Council) from 1957 to 1959. He is presently 
speaker of the Council Negri and a Federal Senator.
36. There were even some "old school" differences between SUPP 
and SCA. The top English-educated SCA leaders were from St. 
Joseph’s School (Catholic) in contrast to the majority of 
the SUPP leaders who were educated at St. Thomas’ School 
(Anglican, S.P.G.).
37. Ling Beng Siew is an extraordinarily astute Foochow business­
man, who has by his own acumen built from nothing a business 
empire that rivals any existing in Sarawak. He has been 
most conspicuously successful in the timber trade, where his 
enterprises predominate. His sheer drive, and willingness to 
spend freely, secured for him the presidency of SCA, at the 
expense of the more conservative William Tan.
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over half of the twenty-three Central Committee members were 
Foochow. It seems that SCA is in fact striving to stimulate 
support based upon dialect group, and to establish itself as the 
party for the rich young aspiring Chinese executive.
Party frjjegara Sarawak: PANAS
The relationship between the Brooke Rajahs and their indig­
enous subjects had acquired a distinctly sentimental character, 
and there remained strong native support for continuation of the 
Raj. The Brookes had accorded privileged status to the Malay 
community in the realm of administration and government and had 
provided educational facilities principally for that ethnic group. 
At the end of Brooke rule, the permanent civil service consisted 
of: 1371 Malays; 456 Dayaks; 426 Chinese; and 49 Europeans.
The ethnic breakdown of the last Brooke-appointed Council Negri 
was: 19 Malays; 12 Europeans; 4 Dayaks; 3 Chinese; and 1 Indian.38
Malays, however, accounted for less than one-quarter of the 
state!s population.
Wartime acquiescence to Japanese rule on the part of the 
Malay leadership only served to confirm Colonial Office opinions 
that preferential treatment for the Malays should be discontinued. 
This basic policy change set the British directly at odds with 
the Malay community, but London successfully effected the policy 
shift in Sarawak, in contrast to the unsuccessful Malayan Union 
plan in Malaya. Sarawak was ceded to Britain and formally became 
a British colony on July 1, 1946. British success in Sarawak 
resulted largely from the much smaller proportion of Malays in 
the population— 18%, compared with nearly 50% in Malaya. The 
British expeditiously divided the local Malay aristocracy, buying 
the support of important leaders for the British position as "the 
only realistic stance.1 At the same time, a British political 
quarantine of Sarawak during this period assisted efforts to 
achieve compliance.
A major cleavage appeared within the Malay community as a 
result of the bitter dispute over Cession. An analysis of that 
controversy is beyond the limits of this study, suffice it to 
consider here but a few of its enduring consequences. During 
the late 1940Ts, a proliferation of organizations had formed to 
oppose Cession. Some seventeen associations declared their
38. Higher ranking Malay Civil Servants were essentially drawn 
from a limited number of families with "aristocratic" con­
nections. Not until September 1940, was the first Malay 
officer who was not from this "charmed circle" appointed 
(Mohd. Aton bin Saji). The ethnic composition of the civil 
service is in: Max Seitleman, "The Cession of Sarawak,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 11, 1948, p. 36; and 
of the Council Negri in: Sarawak Gazette, July 31, 1964.
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support for independence under the Rajah: most important, the
Malay National Union and its affiliates the Pergerakkan Pemuda 
Melayu (Malay Youth Movement) and the Barisan Pemuda Sarawak 
(Sarawak Youth Front). The Malay National Union had been formed 
in 1939, all the other associations were post-war phenomena.
By contrast, the only Malay organization supporting Cession was 
the Young Malay Association, under the leadership of the then- 
Assiqtant Commissioner of Police, Abang Othman. This latter 
organization, though avowedly non-political, enjoyed the imprimatur 
of the Colonial authorities, and it fervently celebrated British 
Royal weddings and births.
The struggle against Cession caused great personal hardship 
to certain Malay families. The new Government insisted that all 
Civil Servants sign a Circular expressing their loyalty to the 
British Crown. A total of 338 officers (335 of them Malays) in 
higher Government positions refused to comply and resigned effec­
tive April 1, 1947.39 40 For more than two years thereafter, feel­
ings and frustrations simmered throughout the Malay kampongs. 
Recriminations were rife, directed more against those Malays 
who had benefitted from Cession than against the Colonial 
authorities themselves. The heir apparent to the Raj, Mr.
Anthony Brooke, was himself prohibited from re-entering Sarawak 
under a provision of the Undesirable Persons Ordinance.1*0
The Chinese community tended to benefit from the withdrawal 
of the privileged status hitherto accorded to the Malays, as did 
the Dayaks. Individual Malays were seen to "adjust" unobtrusively 
to the new order. The passage of time was definitely against 
those determined to restore the Brooke Raj. The situation was 
one of frustration, perhaps desperation, for there appeared to 
be no legitimate means of restoring Brooke rule. By early 1949, 
a Sibu-based clandestine association, The Thirteen Essential 
Ingredients, was formed by members of the Pergerakkan Pemuda 
Melayu. The thirteen members were sworn to achieve two objects. 
First, "To sacrifice themselves if the necessity arose, because 
they had been resisting in vain for three years. It was essential 
to get liberation restored as soon as possible. They must take 
action because the justice they had awaited from the British 
Government had not materialized." Second, "To wait for the
39. A breakdown of the Government departments from which they 
resigned indicates the following as the most important: 
Education, 76 resignations; Posts and Telegraphs, 43; Marine, 
40; Customs, 26; Medical and Health, 18; Printing, 18; Land 
and Survey, 18. Most also lived in the vicinity of Kuching. 
The Government admitted that more than half of its Malay 
teachers had resigned also because of Cession, causing the 
closure of one-third of all Government Malay Schools.
Sarawak, Annual Report, 1947 (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1948)", p. 47.
40. Sarawak‘Tribune, March 11, 1947.
t'4R^ T’precise action and assassinate the Governor
8 s. :r ! Cbribbalbd dmbhg a: group of Sibu school children, lined up 
in hbhip^of^the^Gov^hor’s first visit, two members fatally 
Stabbed8Mi&c&ft1 SteWdf t , the Second Governor. This outrage 
galv&pdz^d ©piriibffagainst the anti-Cessionists and terminated 
the^atifectiVe^ politidal influence of all Malay organizations 
8dppbsed to the"Colonial regime. Four conspirators ware hanged 
1 and 'another ' seven g^iven long prison sentences; the Pergerakkan 
Pemuda Melayu was declared an illegal society. One indication 
of the chilling and longlasting effect of this political violence 
is shown by 1 th'e8 suspension of all meetings by the Baris an Pemuda 
Sarawak until-IB5 8 , ;: r r
Two' Subsequent external developments helped consolidate the 
position Of the' Colonial Government. First, the rapid rise in 
cbiinnodity ;'pf ices as- ai result of the Korean War greatly increased 
the' general level of prosperity throughout Sarawak. Second, there 
was- a~ genefal decline--In the security of the Western position 
throughout: Asia^'as5evidenced by the Korean War, the Malayan 
Emergericyyarid:the-- gravity of the fighting in Indo-China. In view 
of the. ihtefhktiohal8 situation, Mr. Anthony Brooke, the Raj ah 
Muda, resolved tbM cease his activities against Cession and urged 
all in Sarawak to do likewise.h2 From that time onward, the 
organizatiofts 'Working'against Cession lay dormant, never to regain 
effective popular support.
The formation of SUPP brought to a head Malay apprehension 
of the growing wealth and power of the Chinese community. The 
Brooke regime•had never quite forgotten the Chinese rebellion of 
1857, and consequently had been reluctant to utlize Chinese in­
dustry and talent to its full capacity. Thus they had chosen to 
rely heavily upon* the Malays who were particularly well represented 
throughout the administrative machine, especially in the police 
force. The Malays^had'-come to regard themselves as a privileged 
class, with a few-^aristocrats acting as the conduits and dispensers 
o f; po lit i edi; p owe f .f 3 •
With the; -Colonial regime came the spread of education to 
other native races and the growing economic predominance of the 
Chinese. The widespread involvement of the other races in Govern­
ment arid theri: pbiitids' served to underline the lowered status 
and importdrie'e ofrthe Malay community. The leaders of the Malay 
cbhMUnaty Tiyedlih sufficiently close proximity to observe the 
^rbwiil^ we&ltlf ariel power* bf the Chinese in the urban districts.
--nvr-M—rrt—t<t  i •
41V IbidV, dadudfy" 7 , 1950.
r T j ' o o r i o 8 y f ' oM t ;i? ; ?
42*. lM<f. ,? fblifudfy 5:^ 1951. £qv the; response , of the Anti-Cession 
Movement and of the Sarawak Government, see: ibidV, February 
8, 1951.
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They were sufficiently sophisticated to grasp the implication of 
the formation of a party that commanded the active support of 
the Chinese community. The Malays were also more familiar with 
the tactics of political maneuver than were other natives, for 
though the campaign against Cession had been unsuccessful, much 
experience had been accumulated in the process.
The 1959 General Elections spurred Malay leaders to action. 
In that contest, SUPP had achieved notable success not only in 
the Kuching Municipal area, but also in the predominantly native 
Kuching rural districts. During that campaign, the Datu Bandar 
(the highest ranking Malay) and a handful of colleagues carried 
out an improvised campaign in the coastal areas, endeavoring to 
convince over-eager prospective candidates that plural nomina­
tions for a single seat would only serve to ensure SUPP vic­
tories. On December 7, 1959, the Datu Bandar called all members 
of Council Negri who had not joined SUPP to a meeting at his 
residence. There he emphasized the urgency of forming a party 
"with an entirely different outlook than the SUPP." A majority 
of the Councillors present assured their support, and the Datu 
Bandar1*3 was then given three months leave from his post as 
Government Advisor for Native Affairs to organize the party.
Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) was duly registered on April 
9, I960, only ten months after the formation of SUPP. The first 
Central Executive of the party had a fairly balanced representa­
tion of Malays, Chinese and Dayaks, with the Datu Bandar as 
Chairman and his brother, Abang Othman, **** Secretary-General.
The party was, in effect, the semi-official answer to SUPP, and 
included within its ranks a number of Dayaks, some wealthier 43
43. Report of the Secretary-General, Abang Othman, to the PANAS 
General Meeting for 1960 and 1961, Mimeo. (Kuching, May 
T9F2T7 The Datu Bandar, Abang Haji Mustapha, was the grandson 
of the original Datu Hakim under the first Rajah of Sarawak.
In 1941, the Rajah appointed him Datu Pahlawan and promoted 
him to Datu Bandar in 1946. As the highest ranking Malay,
one who had been in Government service all his life, he was 
continually chosen to advise the new Government on matters 
pertaining to his community. He was a member of the Supreme 
Council from 1960 to 1963. According to one source, the Datu 
Bandar mortgaged his personal resources to support PANAS; 
at his death a large part of the receipts from the sale of 
his house were needed to liquidate his debt to the Bian Chiang 
Bank--the same bank which played a significant role as 
financier of SUPP and later SNAP.
44. Abang Othman, brother of the late Datu Bandar, retired from 
his post as Deputy Superintendent of the Sarawak Constabulary 
to become a founding member of PANAS. While in Government 
service, he had served as Secretary of the Young Malay 
Association, formed to support the Cession.
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Chinese and many Malays— especially those who had not strenuously 
opposed Cession. The party included a broad group of established 
leaders, "established" in the sense that they were Government 
recognized, of reasonable means, and frequently appointed by the 
Government to representative institutions.
Respite initial significant representation of each major 
race, the party over time came increasingly under Malay control, 
with other communities having only token representation.. The 
racial composition of the PANAS Central Executive Committee of 
1963, compared with that for 1960 (given in parentheses), serves to 
underline this change in ethnic support: Malays, 20 (5); Chinese,
6 (7); Ibans, 4 (3); Land Dayaks, 1 (2); Kayans, 1 (0); Indians,
1 (0); uncertain, 2 (2); total, 35 (19).
PANAS rapidly expanded its support throughout the First 
Division, particularly in the Malay kampongs and adjacent Land 
Dayak districts. The Secretary-General of the party reported 
that, by May 1962, the total racial composition of PANAS was:








Malay Iban Dayak Melanau Chinese 8 Bugis Other Total
38 % 37% 19.5% 3% i % i % 0.5% 100%
17.5% 31% 8 % 6% 31.5% 6% 100%
The object of the party was primarily, "To protect, safeguard, 
support, foster and promote the political, educational, religious, 
economic, social and cultural interests of the indigenous people 
of Sarawak particularly and of the RaTayat of Sarawak generally."h6 
Though the initial policy of PANAS was to "provide equality of 
opportunity for all communities," it became increasingly evident 
to the leaders that this approach could not solve the problem of 
uplifting the indigenous races to a level comparable with the 
Chinese: "We the indigenous people are backward in almost every
sphere of political enterprise such as in education, economy, 
etc. There is no doubt about it and this is evident in the 456
45. Report of the Secretary General to the PANAS General Meeting, 
Kuching, May 1962 (typescript).
46. Object No. 1 of the PANAS constitution; the constitution 
specifies that the expression "Ra'ayat of Sarawak" means:
"All persons of whatever race who were born and have their 
true homes in Sarawak."
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villages, longhouses and kampongs throughout the country."k7
This pro-native emphasis was both cause and consequence of 
decreased Chinese support for PANAS, and the party soon changed 
from its broadly non-communal stance to one which sought to 
maximize support from a more limited communal base. Despite 
ideological differences, a process only too familiar to the SUPP 
leadership was occurring also in PANAS. The over-representation 
of one ethnic group led to emphasis on the issues of most inter­
est to that section, and that led to loss of interest in the 
party by other races. One further imperative spurred PANAS, 
and to a lesser degree SUPP, to more strident explication of 
communal concerns— the formation of more parties with narrower 
racial bases of support.
Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak: BARJASA
Those Malays opposed to Cession had remained politically 
dormant for a full nine years after the assassination of the 
Second Governor, Duncan Stewart. In August 1958, supporters of 
the defunct Barisan Pemuda Sarawak (BPS) met in Kuching and 
resolved to revive the organization. The former President of 
Barisan Pemuda Sarawak observed, "You can see by yourselves how 
very far our people are being left behind now." The new President, 
Ahmad Zaidie bin Adruce, said:
I am sick at heart to see the present conditions of 
our people. . . .  We are not contented with our 
present situation and that is why we make various 
movements to fight for our rights in our own land.
I am sad because we are still asleep. I call you 
all to wake up. . . . If you are afraid that !your
rice pot be inverted one day, you will find your­
selves imprisoned under a big cauldron.f48
The organization as reconstituted was racial and political; its 
re-vitalization was in response to growing Chinese preponderance 
in the economy, the administration and political life. Its 
leader was clearly Admad Zaidie, a passionate Malay revolutionary, 
and he gathered around himself many young admirers.
Ahmad Zaidie captured, better than any other Sarawak Malay, 
the feelings of frustrated Malay nationalism. The Malays, who 
had lost their former privileges, could only look with envy to 
Indonesia and Sukarno— the great Malay liberator! Ahamd Zaidie 
focused intellectual Malay discontent toward his vision of a 
Borneo federation, "Bornesia," under the Sultan of Brunei, side- 478
47. Report of the Secretary-General to the PANAS General Meeting, 
May 1962.
48. Barisan Pemuda Sarawak, General Meeting, August 16, 1958.
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by-side with Indonesia. He attended for a year the Sultan Idris 
Training College in Malaya, and then during the Japanese occupa­
tion, he was sent to the Bogor Veterinary College in Java where 
he became a close friend of A. M. Azahari. He took part in the 
struggle against the Dutch, being promoted to a Staff Officer in 
the Kalimantan Marine D i v i s i o n . U p o n  return to Sarawak at the 
end of 1947, he joined the Education Department, which sent him 
to Scotland for further training. He studied there until 1955, 
returning with an M.A. Degree— a much higher educational level 
than any other Sarawak Malay. He inspired his youthful followers 
with oratory that glorified the past greatness of the Malays—  
their Majapahit, their Malacca, their Brunei. He emphasized how 
the natives must unite and rise. He was bitterly anti-Chinese 
and believed in bloodshed if they did not submit. In 1956, he 
was elected Vice-Chairman of the Kuching Municipal Council. The 
following year he became President of the Barisan Pemuda Sarawak 
and was appointed a Government Education Officer, the highest 
ranking Malay officer in that Department, and stationed in Sibu.
He exerted his greatest influence (from 1957 until late 1961) 
through his Presidency of the BPS and his close relationship with 
Malay teachers. Primary School teachers can be very influential 
in the small kampong communities.
The uprising against the British "colonialists1 was to be 
modelled on the Indonesian experience. But the concept of 
Malaysia threw Zaidie off balance— it jeopardized his plans, his 
dream, and was the turning point in his leadership. His followers 
split. Ahmad Zaidie came to believe that Malaysia was a trick, 
whereas many of his followers saw it as a sure way to merdeka 
(independence). The "year of decision" was 1962 and the verdict 
was against ZaidieTs brand of militance, although the Indonesian 
appeal to one people, one language, one country still struck a 
ready cord, and the struggle of the Sarawak Malays retained an 
affinity with the Indonesian struggle. But Malaysia was to be a 
reality within two years; Zaidie still offered only a vision.
The new party, BARJASA, drew the moderates from his BPS and dir­
ected their energies toward the fight for Malaysia. BPS itself 
declared for Malaysia, and Zaidie lost the chance to lead the 
mainstream of Malay action. A confidant says he withdrew from 
the crowds, grew downhearted, and lost his grip on reality. Yet 
his cause was not without significant pockets of support.
The Sundar branch of BPS (in the Fifth Division) told the 
Cobbold Commission, "The Malaysia Plan was just a ruse used on 
the Borneo people to make them give up their fight for self- 
determination. It was a trick by which Malaya hoped to colonise 
the Borneo territories. . . . The three Borneo territories should 49*
49. He held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Angkatan Laut 
Republik Indonesia, Divisi IV and performed the functions
of Kepala Staf I. H. Hassan Basry, Kisah Gerila Kalimantan 
(Dalam Revolusi Indonesia) 1945-1949 (Bandjarmasin: Lambung
Mangkurat, 1961), p. 92.
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be given independence first."50 The District Officer reported 
that "Barisan Pemuda had a strong following in the Malay/Kedayan 
parts of the (Fifth) Division. . . . Some of its leaders had
strong pro-Indonesian leanings."51
, The Brunei revolt came a year too late for any real possi­
bility of "liberating" more than Brunei and its immediate 
environs. When it did take place, it was triggered prematurely 
by the arrest of a number of rebels on the Sarawak side of the 
border. The outcome was not what Zaidie had promised. There 
was no simultaneous uprising. The only apparent result was the 
complete discrediting of the Limbang BPS branch for its com­
plicity and the arrest of many associates for their support of 
the Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU). Zaidie himself 
was imprisoned and later placed under house arrest. On Malaysia 
Day 1963, he slipped away to Indonesia. It is ironic that had 
he remained in Sarawak, he would likely have been appointed 
Director of Education by 1967 or 1968. Instead he was on the 
list of the men most "wanted" by the Malaysian Government during 
the period of Indonesian Confrontation.
The membership of BPS was limited exclusively to natives.
Its stated political objectives were: to unite and prepare
the natives of Sarawak for self-determination; to protect the 
rights of the natives and promote their interests; and to combat 
any element from inside or outside Sarawak which was deemed 
detrimental to the interests of the natives and the country.52 
BPS branches were systematically established in Malay kampongs 
in every Sarawak division in the period from July 1959 to 
February 1963. Because of the common race and religion, it 
might have been expected that these Malays would join PANAS, 
but BPS activists usually were not willing to do so for two 
principal reasons. First, the Chairman of PANAS, the Datu 
Bandar, had strongly supported Cession— a stance which had led 
to allegations that he had received substantial personal rewards 
from the British. He was indeed awarded a C.B.E., appointed to 
numerous Government boards as the highest-ranking leader of the 
Malay community, and he tended to be somewhat dictatorial in his 
dealings with subordinates. Second, PANAS was led by the Kuching 
Malay "Abangs," the aristocrats of their community, and thus 
there was a difference of class, age and outlook between the 
leaders of PANAS and the members of BPS.
At the end of 1961, Sarawak1s fourth political party was 
officially registered. The party, Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak 
(BARJASA), served to underline and help perpetuate the most 
basic cleavage within the Malay community, one which had disrupted
50. Ibid., March 21, 1962.
51. Annual Report of the Resident, Fifth Division for 1963, in: 
Sarawak Gazette, June 30, 1964.
52. Barisan Pemuda Sarawak, Revised Draft By-Laws, September 
1958 (typescript).
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personal relationships from the time of Cession. The Chairman 
of the party was Datu Tuanku Bujang,53 the highest ranking Sibu 
Malay; he had clashed bitterly with the Datu Bandar at the time 
of Cession. The party set out to include all natives, but the 
four Dayaks on the first Central Executive had all been associ­
ated with the anti-Cession Sarawak Dayak Association. The party 
did allow a few Chinese to join (one appeared on the Central 
Executive in 1962), but they were never in a position to influ­
ence policy. BARJASA leaders openly argued in favor of special 
privileges for the indigenous peoples and omitted Chinese from 
their list of "Sarawak races."
The intellectual drive behind the party came from three men—  
Abdul Rahman bin Yakub, Abdul Taib bin Mahmud and Abang Han bin 
Abang Ahmad--two were public servants and their names could not 
appear on party executive lists.
Abang Han was made Publicity Chief of the party upon forma­
tion, and became its Executive Secretary in 1963. He had an 
early initiation to politics in Sibu, where he was at one time 
librarian to the Pergerakkan Pemuda Melayu. He had been sentenced 
to death in connection with the murder of Duncan Stewart, but the 
sentence was later commuted, and he served a ten-year term in 
prison. Abdul Rahman bin Yakub, a Muslim Melanau and son of a 
Bintulu fisherman, had surmounted many difficulties in his quest 
for education and promotion. Through part-time work and study, 
he finally earned his Senior Cambridge Certificate, and later 
graduated in law from the University of Southampton. Upon his 
return to Sarawak, he was appointed a Deputy Public Prosecutor, 
but his promotion was impeded by unsympathetic expatriate officers. 
Abdul Taib bin Mahmud, nephew of Abdul Rahman bin Yakub, en­
countered few of the difficulties that hindered Abdul RahmanTs 
progress, mainly due to the changes that had taken place in the 
eight years that separated the two men. The war was well over 
when Taib needed his secondary education; qualified natives were 
promised accelerated promotion, when the time came for Taib to 
return from his legal training at the University of Adelaide.
Though Taib did not stand for election in 1963, he was nominated 
to the first State Cabinet, and thus became the only well-educated 
native member.
Other prominent leaders of BARJASA included: Haji Sufut
bin Tahir and Che Ajibah binte Abol, both of whom had been prom­
inent anti-Cessionists; Ainnie bin Dhobi, whose brother had been 
hanged for the assassination of Duncan Stewart; Ustaz Mohd.
Mortadza bin Haji Daud; Ustaz Abdul Kadir bin Hassan; and Haji 
Busrah bin Osman, Iman of the Indian Mosque. Ustaz Mortadza was 
chosen by BARJASA to broadcast its election policy speech. He 
and Ustaz Abdul Kadir were at that time lecturers attached to 
the Majlis Islam of Sarawak, the chief authority for Islamic
53. In 1969, he was appointed Governor of Sarawak by the Prime 
Minister.
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religion and Malay customary law. Ustaz Mortadza has subsequently 
been appointed President of the Majlis Islam. Though both lec­
turers formally resigned from BARJASA in December 1963, they con­
tinued to be closely associated with the party leadership.
Thus the party had a core of younger activist Muslims, 
conscious of their religion and tending to be much less friendly 
to tlfiie Colonial Government than the "Abangs" of PANAS. Because 
their appeal to Malays was at the expense of the aristocratic 
"recognized1 leaders of the First Division, their immediate 
recruitment potential was limited. More than half of the Malays 
live in the First Division, and the old-established ties of 
respect for the "Abangs" militated against BARJASA’s efforts to 
win the support of these Malays. In fact, the conspicuous suc­
cesses were registered among Muslim Melanaus, some Land Dayaks, 
and Malays resident in the other Divisions of Sarawak.
A social profile of the type of candidate successfully 
elected by BARJASA (in 1963) exhibits the following character­
istics, in comparison with the PANAS Councillor. The BARJASA 
Councillor is five years younger, has double the chance of being 
a professional, and is more likely to have been a Government 
employee at some time during his life. He is less well educated, 
though more likely to have received that education in the English 
medium than in Malay. Whereas more than one in four of all PANAS 
Councillors were Government-paid Tua Kampongs, only one in nine 
of the BARJASA Councillors could claim the same distinction.
Thus there are rather important social differences between those 
recruited to PANAS and those recruited to BARJASA, the two 
principal Muslim parties.
Sarawak National Party: SNAP
The British colonial administration believed that the Malays 
and the Dayaks had shown markedly different attitudes toward the 
Japanese invaders. Whereas the Malays "treated the Japanese with 
respect," the Dayaks had "fiercely resented their presence and 
did their best to make things difficult for them. . . . "  More­
over, when re-occupation began, "The Dayaks rose in their 
thousands and took a heavy toll of the Japanese."5h
The Japanese occupation authorities did not impinge upon the 
local populace as deeply as in neighboring states of Southeast 
Asia. In contrast even to Sabah, there were no rebellions as 
such and only limited Japanese repression. Among the positive 
features of that period was the initial promotion of Malays and 
Dayaks to replace lower echelon European administrative officers. 54
54. Mr. C. W. Dawson, the Chief Secretary of Sarawak, Private 
papers, November 25, 1947 (typescript).
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A Dayak was even appointed Resident of the Second Division, one 
of the top six posts in the Rajah's Government. There were 
scattered incidents during 1945, mostly attacks against the 
Japanese, and an ugly situation did develop in the Kanowit dis­
trict of the Third Division, where some twenty-three Chinese 
were killed by Dayak irregular forces.55 This affair soured 
local race relations, and memory of it was kept alive by per­
sisted Chinese efforts to re-open the case, consequent upon the 
acquittal of those responsible. Still this one incident was an 
isolated exception, not the rule.
Because many Malays remained hostile to the Colonial regime, 
its officers identified emotionally with the Dayaks, whom the 
Rajah had left as "happy savages in happy, savage surroundings."56 
The ideal of the simple and trustworthy Dayaks was juxtaposed 
against a caricature of scheming Malays and greedy Chinese, 
both participating in political movements at variance with British 
colonial desires. There were important historical precedents 
for reliance upon the Dayaks, for, as Pringle has shown, the very 
continuance of the Brooke Raj, for a time, was utterly dependent 
upon its Dayak backing.57 Shortly after the war, the British 
began a major thrust to propel into modernity the hitherto neg­
lected Dayaks. After only a year and one-half of Colonial rule, 
the numer of non-Malay natives attending school was already al­
most four times the figure for 1940,58 such was the higher 
priority accorded to the Dayaks under the new Government.
Early Dayak political aspirations were of a fragmentary 
character. From the small educated group in Kuching, a Sarawak 
Dayak Association was formed which supported the Malay National 
Union in the fight against Cession. At its inception, the Sarawak 
Dayak Association included representatives of various families 
whose members have since achieved considerable prominence in the 
political arena, but as it committed itself more exclusively to 
the fight against Cession, and then, in December 1947, added 
"politics" as one of its aims and objects, the SDA rapidly lost 
its character as a representative of the educated urban Dayak. 
Throughout the 1950fs, two men controlled the Association, Eliab 
Bayang and Robert Jitam. Eliab Bayang had been Resident of the 
Second Division under the Japanese and became embittered after 
the British dismissed him from the Administration. Robert Jitam, 
also from a traditionally prominent Sebuyau Dayak family, was 
detained for a month at the end of 1962 for alleged complicity 
in the abortive Brunei revolt. Both men identified themselves
55. Annual Report of the District Officer, Kanowit, for the year 
1946 (typescript).
56. C. W. Dawson, Private papers, November 7, 1950 (typescript).
57. Robert Maxwell Pringle, "The Ibans of Sarawak under Brooke Rule, 
1841-1941" (Unpub. Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1967).
58. Sarawak, Colonial Development and Welfare Plan, p. 14 (type­
script, 1950).
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closely with the Brooke Malay leadership— a new, exclusively- 
Dayak leadership passed them by.
Outside the capital, there were few expressions of Dayak 
feeling for or against Cession. The only outbursts were from 
those who employed the issue as a way of articulating their 
generalized hostility toward Government authority.59 Except for 
a limited degree of sentimental attachment, the Third Rajah had 
not affected the Dayaks in such a manner as would have engendered 
basic hostility to Cession. Objectively, the Dayaks had little 
to lose from the change.
The inclusion by SUPP of a number of Dayaks in its Central 
Committee was indicative of its intention to gain maximum 
native support. The party did in fact successfully gain a 
good deal of Dayak support in its early years-* more than is 
generally recognized. To the Ibans, particularly of the Saribas 
areas, PANAS was not a viable alternative, for they believed 
that party to be Malay controlled. The formation of the third 
party— the Sarawak National Party (SNAP)— took the Government 
by surprise, for none of the founders were Government recognized 
leaders (Kapitans, Penghulus or Tua Kampongs) or members of the 
Council Negri.60 This was in distinct contrast to SUPP and 
particularly PANAS. The first SNAP Executive Committee was 
composed exclusively of Ibans originating from the Saribas 
district of Sarawak’s Second Division. Half of the Executive 
members had been employed by Shell Oilfields Ltd.— in Brunei 
or in adjacent areas of Sarawak. Shell had provided a somewhat 
different political tutelage to that of the Government in 
Kuching.
The founders were a particularly mobile self-made group of 
Ibans. The Chairman of SNAP, J. S. Tinker, was born in Betong, 
educated in Kuching, and worked with Shell through the 1920fs 
before joining the Government service in Kuching. He worked as 
a District Officer during the Japanese occupation. Both Vice- 
Chairmen had spent considerable time in Singapore. Edward 
Howell was educated there at St. Andrew’s School and then the 
Raffles Institution. Lionell Bediman Ketit had worked in a
59. Some Dayaks took an opposite line to the Malays by espousing
a pro-British cause, objecting to claims that "the natives of 
Sarawak are against Cession. . . . [On the other hand] a few
ex-Penghulus and other trouble makers also belong to the 
Pergerakkan Pemuda Melayu . . . merely because it is ’agin the
Government.’” Annual Report of the District Officer, Kanowit 
(typescript, 1947).
60. Not only was SNAP dominated by Ibans, but there has been a 
conspicuous absence of Government-appointed Dayaks at all 
levels of the party. For instance, the proportion of Penghulus, 
Pengarahs, Tua Kampongs, Tuai Rumahs and Orang Kaya Pemanchas
to Dayak members of the Central Executive Committee rose from 
6% in 1964 to only 14% in 1966-67 and dropped to 12% in 
1967-68.
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family business in Singapore from 1933 to the end of the war and 
for Brunei Shell from 1949 to 1961. His family is prominent in 
the Saribas district. Ketit was Vice-President of the Dayak 
Association, Brunei, from its inception in 1958. The Secretary- 
General of SNAP was Stephen Kalong Ningkan, who had worked as a 
Hospital Assistant for Brunei Shell from 1950 to 1960. While 
there he had formed the Dayak Association (1958), in competition 
with the Company sponsored Dayak Club, and was elected its Presi­
dent. Ningkan had worked earlier with the Police in the Third 
Division, stationed at Kapit during the Japanese occupation.
These four men--Tinker, Howell, Ketit and Ningkan--were the 
prime movers behind the formation of SNAP. Other members of the 
first Central Committee were Edwin Howell, who had served as an 
engineer with Brunei Shell; David Lawrence Usit, who had moved 
to Sabah and spent the years prior to the war working there; 
Matthew Danna Ujai, who had also spent some time in Singapore 
and Malaya; Andrew Bunga; and Azarias Malong.
The actual decision to form the party was taken in Brunei; 
the prime movers then resigned from their Shell positions and 
proceeded to Kuching to effect registration. The party was 
formally inaugurated on April 10, 1961. It appears to have 
existed on meagre resources, principally the pensions and savings 
of the founders. The financial report for the first year (to 
May 14, 1962) lists loans to the party from S. K. Ningkan 
(M$l,724), Bediman Ketit (M$851), and J. S. Tinker (M$385).
A year later the Central Executive Committee, though changed 
a little, was still entirely Iban with one exception— Maurice 
Krisha Menon, a former Shell employee. Though an Indian, he 
was married to an Iban and lived in Betong, administrative head­
quarters of the Saribas district.
SNAP formed its first branches in the First, Second, Fourth 
and Fifth Division— within those divisions almost all the branches 
were located in predominantly Iban districts. The Fourth and 
Fifth Division branches were in the areas where Ibans had migrated 
from the Second Division. In 1962, SNAP extended to the Third 
Division, but confined its branches to the northern Mukah, Oya 
and Balingian districts--areas which were also linked by migra­
tion from the Second Division.
In the period 1963 to 1965, SNAP consolidated its branch 
structure in the Second and Fourth Divisions. The party, though 
including other races, remained predominantly Iban through 1965-- 
introducing the first two Chinese to the eighteen-member Central 
Executive Committee in 1964, and adding one more Chinese in 1965. 
No Malays were yet included, a factor related in some measure to 
the history of antipathy toward Malays in the Saribas District, 
from which the original founders of SNAP came. The dramatic 
changes in SNAP took place in 1966, stimulated by its ejection 
from the ruling Alliance Government. These changes will be dis­
cussed as we consider the Sarawak Alliance Party.
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Initial policy statements by SNAP suggested an "input" from 
various directions, for the party stressed Sarawak nationalism, 
advancement of native interests, and conservative economics. The 
first two elements can be viewed as a reflection of Iban leader­
ship, and the communal interests of that race; support for con­
servative economics is more likely a reflection of tutorship 
by Shell Oil Company personnel.61
Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak: PESAKA
The Ibans have also been divided in the course of history.
Rajah Charles Brooke employed Second Division Ibans (Sea Dayaks), 
principally from the Saribas district, in his efforts to pacify 
Ibans of the Rejang River, Third Division. The animosities 
aroused by those campaigns still persist. The Brookes also 
allocated exclusive territory to particular Christian Missions.
The Second Division was an Anglican (S.P.G.) preserve and that 
Mission established schools in the Dayak areas— most notably 
St. Augustine1s, Betong, in the heart of the Saribas district.
The Rajah permitted the Methodist and Catholic churches to 
proselytize in the Third Division. Both those churches chose 
to locate their schools in the predominantly Chinese and Malay 
town areas. The Ibans of the Second Division had thus been 
exposed to Government, and to education, longer and more 
thoroughly than those of the Third Division. The historic 
cleavage, born in battle, was cemented on a more durable base.
For this reason, the formation of SNAP had very little impact 
throughout the whole length of the Rejang and its watershed.
The only areas of the Third Division where SNAP developed signi­
ficant support were the Mukah, Oya and Balingian Districts— areas 
linked by comparatively recent migration from the Second Division.
The Dayaks of the Third Division were fragmented politically. 
Some were members of SUPP, others had followed Temenggong Jugah 
and joined PANAS, and those in the northern district had joined 
SNAP. Numerically they were of critical importance to the future 
of Sarawak, particularly under the tiered electoral system. The 
Third Division has the highest population of any Division, and 
the Ibans are a clear majority of its population. By mid-1962, 
those with a broader view could see that the British Government 
was intent upon forging ahead with the formation of Malaysia, 
thus substantially accelerating the drive toward independence.
It was also clear that although the Third Division Ibans were in 
a pivotal position, they were so split as to be rendered politically
61. A senior Shell officer was reputed to have personally guided 
Stephen Kalong Ningkan during his years in Brunei. A Shell 
lawyer drafted the party’s constitution. The first two 
"internal" policies to be followed by SNAP were listed as: 
"1. A balanced budget," and "2. A reduced national debt." 
Neither, of those planks were stressed in subsequent party 
policy statements.
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ineffectual3 and could be "swamped" within Malaysia.62 63
A senior expatriate officer initiated unofficial efforts to 
form a party that would unite the Rejang River Dayaks, and thus 
create a bond that would enable them to become politically potent 
and stand on their own feet. The key Dayaks in the formation of 
this hew Party PESAKA were Penghulu Masam anak Radin, T. R. 
Francis Bujang anak Manja, Penghulu Francis Umpau and Penghulu 
Chundi anak Resa. The first three lived in the Kanowit district 
and the fourth in Sungei Aup, Sibu district. Penghulus Masam 
and Francis Bujang had served as trackers with the Sarawak 
Rangers during the Malayan Emergency. Penghulu Umpau was a 
brother-in-law of Penghulu Francis Bujang, and they both had been 
Primary School teachers. Another important Iban was soon to 
leave SUPP and join PESAKA— Jonathan Bangau, who had been both 
a schoolteacher and an enterprising businessman.
Though Penghulu Umpau was a member of the PANAS Central Com­
mittee, he was quite willing to step down and form a new party. 
The same was not true for Temenggong Jugah, then a Vice-Chairman 
of PANAS, who seemed to value the "old boy" character of PANAS.
In mid-July 1962, the Temenggong was confronted by the four 
founders, and their many supporters, at the Sibu airport. A 
passionate argument ensued with Jugah relenting in the end and 
agreeing to proceed to Kanowit. Drafting of the inaugural state­
ment and constitution and the selection of officers took the 
following four days and nights. Party PESAKA limited its member­
ship exclusively to Dayaks, and its objects among others in­
cluded : 6 3
To assist all Dayaks to unite in pursuing the common 
aim and interest with the object of promoting and 
presenting an unifying [sic] approach to problems 
which affect their people in the successful govern­
ment of this country.
To preserve the heritage of Sarawak having regard to 
the necessity of promoting the political, social, 
economical and cultural advancement of the Dayaks in 
a constantly changing world.
To ensure by all constitutional means the Dayaks have 
a rightful say in the government of the territory.
Temenggong Jugah became the founder President of the new party.
62. Pengarah Banyang and Penghulu Umpau, announcing their inten­
tion to form a political party, stressed that unless the 
Dayaks "could present a common and united front, they would 
be completely overwhelmed." They went on to confidently 
assert their belief that "future leadership would, of course, 
rest with the Dayak people." Sarawak Tribune, June 18, 1962.
63. Ibid., July 20, 1962.
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By contrast with SNAP, more than half of the Central Execu­
tive Committee members of PESAKA were of the rank of Penghulu or 
above. This remained true until 1966, and PESAKA has often been 
criticized by SNAP members as a "Penghulus* party." The situa­
tion is ^attributable to the relative absence of educated alterna­
tive Dayak leadership in the Third Division, a state of affairs 
whiqh is rapidly changing.
Some 40% of all successful PESAKA Councillors (in 1963) 
held the rank of Penghulu, Pengarah or Orang Kaya Pemancha.
The comparable proportion for SNAP was 22%. As with SNAP,
PESAKA Councillors were overwhelmingly Iban (86% and 91% respec­
tively) , though PESAKA picked up its extra support from the 
"other indigenous" category of peoples. SNAP found its residual 
support from the Land Dayaks. Almost two-thirds of the Council­
lors of both parties were Christian (62% of PESAKA and 65% of 
SNAP), though Anglican was the religion for SNAP and Roman 
Catholic or Methodist for PESAKA. The remaining SNAP and PESAKA 
Councillors were nearly all animist. Age differences between 
Councillors of the two parties are not statistically significant, 
but the level of education of those educated is appreciably higher 
in SNAP than for PESAKA. There is an interesting and influential 
group of eight PESAKA Councillors who have served in the Armed 
forces— most of them having been members of the Sarawak Rangers 
Unit sent to Malaya during the Emergency. These men have played 
an important leadership role in the party.
Conclusion
For the first two years, formal party politics was the ex­
clusive province of two parties, both initially created under 
the auspices of elite groups. SUPP was founded by a core group 
of Hokkien business interests and PANAS by the Kuching Malay 
Abangs. But elite control could not be adequately maintained, 
for a challenge was mounted from within SUPP and from without 
PANAS, a challenge that severely circumscribed each elite’s 
capacity to establish and maintain its hegemony over one whole 
race. The creation of a series of parties, each based upon a 
segment of one major community, set in motion a process that 
threatened to displace the established leadership in each com­
munity. Elite displacement is in fact positively correlated 
with its inability to form a dominant communal party, and the 
ensuing challenge to its ruling position from those of the same 
race.
Maurice Duverger related the origins and growth of political 
parties to the advent of parliaments and an extension in the size 
of the electorate. 6 * This sequential cause-effect association 
was borne out in Sarawak, though often it is inappropriate as a
64. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and 
Activity in the Modern State (New York: Wiley7 1963).
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description of political evolution in Asia. In those states where 
gaining independence involved militant struggle, parties character 
istically antedated extension of the popular franchise and intro­
duction of meaningful parliamentary institutions. There was an 
element of that experience in Sarawak during the abortive struggle 
against Cession (1946-1949), when both the Malay National Union 
and the Barisan Pemuda Sarawak performed most of the functions 
of a political party.
Sarawak party formation in the period under consideration 
(1959-1963) was stimulated by extension of the electorate and 
introduction of responsible parliamentary institutions. However 
the principal motivating force for all but the first two parties 
(SUPP and PANAS) was the impending grant of independence in 1963. 
In a process that gathered momentum, each group perceived that 
this was the moment when they must jockey to establish and pre­
serve their claim to power— hence the ensuing proliferation of 
parties.
Duverger distinguished "internally-created" from "externally- 
created" parties, the latter emerging from outside the existing 
group of legislators and involving a challenge to the ruling group 
SUPP was at its inception an "internally-created" party, a crea­
tion of those who were already legislators. It was followed by 
another such party, PANAS, and later both PESAKA and SCA too were 
such creations. For instance, the number of Council Negri mem­
bers from the period 1955-1959 who joined each party was:
PANAS 8, SUPP 5, SCA 4, and PESAKA 3. By contrast only one 
joined BARJASA and one gave his support to SNAP. At the inception 
of BARJASA and SNAP, their leaders emerged from outside the 
Parliament and represented a challenge to the previously-appointed 
group of legislators. They were the two "externally-created" 
parties.
Although internally-created, the functioning of a democratic­
ally organized party structure soon changed the character of SUPP. 
As influence began to flow reciprocally in two directions, those 
lower down in the network soon learned to manipulate the party 
in order to change its essence, as understood by party founders.
By 1963, SUPP was recruiting most candidates from outside the 
realm of the previously-elected leadership. For if we take all 
District Councillors elected in the 1963 election and identify 
them by the party which they joined (even if not directly elected 
under its auspices), we find that the proportion of Councillors 
elected for the first time was highest in SUPP (69%), with all 
other parties ranked in the following order: SNAP (62%), BARJASA 
(55%), PANAS (50%), PESAKA (33%) and SCA (0%). This is a fair 
indication of the ranking from external to internal creation.
Once SUPP had clearly identified itself as hostile to the 
Colonial Government, and SCA had been created in its stead to 
pursue the conservative stance, each major community had two 




else could be attracted its way. For every major ethnic group 
one party could legitimately claim official support, namely 
PANAS, PESAKA and SCA. The other three, BARJASA, SNAP and SUPP 
sought to usurp power from the influential leadership, as 
represented by the former three parties. Campaigning energies 
and bitterness were principally directed inward, within each 
ethnic group. This trend was especially true for the Malay and 
Chinese communities, where the subsequent election campaign 
caused serious social division.
The very cleavages that militated against communal unity 
created a multiplicity of disagreements which have in face 
promoted conflict resolution through a process of flexible 
realignments. Rather than making racial blocks more rigid, 
as occurred elsewhere in Malaysia, this political division 
within racial communities provided a ready basis for compro­
mise, forcing the factions to seek allies outside their 
community in the quest for political power.
